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The seven states have surrendered to a no action policy at a critical time in the history of the Reclamation Era
September 13, 2022
NARRATIVE FROM ON THE COLORADO (OTC)
"A silent acknowledgement that there is a problem, but a public determination that there isn't...that's the problem."
Overheard in 2019 during a river trip in Grand Canyon National Park.
"Climate changes, their benefits and damages, and the benefits and damages of the actions that bring them about will fall unequally on the world's people and nations. Because of real or perceived inequities, climate change could well be a divisive rather than a unifying factor in world affairs."
Statement from the National Academy of Sciences in 1983.
"Very soon now, everybody will understand what its like to live on an Indian reservation."
Overheard on a Zoom Call in 2022 to organize a climate justice movement.
###The seven states of the Colorado River Basin have always known a day of reckoning would arrive, especially when all their river augmentation proposals failed in the 1960s and again in the 2000s; and for reasons that all the surrounding river basins understand that these water import proposals revealed an insatiable and covetous behavior (See: Letter from Missouri Department of Natural Resources).
Additionally, the price to desalinate seawater for the total deficits in the Colorado River Compact, the Boulder Canyon Project Act, and the Mexican Treaty, as written, would cost USA taxpayers 8 billion dollars per year, and that does not include the construction costs for the pipelines to convey this water to where it is needed, nor the electrical generating stations to supply the energy for all the pumping stations this technology demands. In other words, fixing this problem with extraordinary engineering schemes will cost more than the total combined expenses of every single water project now exisiting in the entire Colorado River Basin. Not to mention it will take 30 to 50 years to complete these construction projects and at a time when all the existing reservoirs are about to empty out.
Have the seven states finally surrendered? Actually, they don't have any other choice. Since the seven states are totally unprepared and unwilling to create a water use reduction strategy at this critical time in history, this whole matter will likely end in the laps of the federal government with an expectation for a taxpayer bailout, or the judicial branch will receive a petition for some imaginary redress. Whereas, changing the baseline misinformation in the 1922 Colorado River Compact to reflect reality, is definately the adult thing to do for this river basin community (See: Sibley's Rivers).
Journals about correcting errors in the 1922 Colorado River Compact
Jack Schimdt, Eric Kuhn and John Fleck
If you look at the scenario planning graphic above, combined water shortages for the Upper and Lower division states (the 7 states) of the Colorado River Basin (CRB) could be as high as 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF) per year once reservoir storage is structurally exhausted, which this Reclamation presentation suggests could happen before Year 2026. This totally makes sense, because the surplus from a wet winter has historically been as high as 7.5 MAF per year. Regaining system reliance to normalize the natural variability of the Colorado River is just not posssible, once system storage is completely lost.
The current annual average of natural flow of the Colorado River at the Compact Point (Lee's Ferry, Arizona) is presently 14.8 million acre-feet (MAF). When the Compact was negotiated in 1922, the average annual yield was 16.8 MAF (natural flow data). The built-in water imbalance for the official administrative record is locked in at negative 2 MAF. The average system losses for reservoir and channel evaporation is also 2 MAF per year. The reduction in supply consequent to global warming, and for the last two decades, is also negative 2 MAF, and this heat will increase until the international community produces an effective climate adaptation accord that reduces geenhouse gas emissions. Morever, human delay tactics to address the new climate reality also helps the CRB deficits to widen.
The water managers can manage the ups and downs of a reservoir system if total system storage is maintained at 60% (the recommendation of 602a Storage Federal Notice & 602a Final EA) but if total system storage is downdrawn to 30% (the present state), then the states have no choice but to accept a maximum shortage call from the basin's watermasters, namely the Secretary of Interior and the Upper Colorado River Commission.
See: Modified graphic from 2004 Final EA for 602a Storage. Modified by Weisheit; the 2026 projection runs off the lower boundary of this Reclamation produced graphic.
In other words, what their intentional procrastination achieved, is a storage system at 30%. The managers did scenario planning when system storage was 65% (2012 AOP), did nothing and why the present situation is so egregious. Instead of choosing to be proactive about reducing demands in 2012, management choose wishful thinking for wet winters, even though their own scenario planning documents clearly demonstrated that reservoir rebounds are short-lived
See: Trace 21 graphic for reservoir elevations; 2012 Basin Study projections from 2010 to 2060.
I will submit that the managers deserve their self-inflicted conundrum. What this means for the communities that they serve, both urban and rural, is that they should begin to make contingency plans for themselves and fill this leadership vacuum.
Colorado River Simulation Systems (CRSS)
A CRSS simulation of Trace 21 represents the historic hydrology of the Colorado River Basin (CRB) beginning in Year 1927. It is the perfect Trace for scenario planning to demonstrte how multi-decadal aridity will affect water deliveries to the 7 states of the CRB under maximum consumption. The persistent dry cycle from 1930 to 1980 was interupted by a wet cycle in the 1980s and the 1990s, and then interupted by severe aridity once again, in the 2000s and the 2010s.
The aridity from 1930 to 1980 did not really impact water deliveries because the system still had surplus water. After the development of the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956 and the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 1968, the system's surplus transitioned into a system deficit. Congress was aware that these new projects would negatively impact the water budget of the basin and initiated cautionary legislation in 1970 called Long Range Operating Criteria (LROC). The latest iteration of LROC planning is 2007 Interim Guidelines, which didn't work because this reservoir stabilization program was based on voluntary cooperation. Cooperation that we now know never existed.
The water managers should have been proactive about balancing the water budget immediately in 1971, especially in the significant drought year of 1977, but the distractions of a wet cycle that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, is why two decades of time was lost to properly plan and prepare for system shortages.
There were institutions (below) that were paying attention and they provided appropriate and justified warnings, and based on existing scenario planning exercises. Both institutions remarked that if actions were not taken, then the result would be system collapse.
Exerpts from GAO
Exerpts from Scripps
MORE FROM 2012 BASIN STUDY
Please take a look at this graphic from Reclamation and the 7 states. This is a scenario planning graphic from Appendix G of 2012 Basin Study:
I placed six red dots in this modified graphic that represents the real time elevation of Lake Powell as of January 1, 2022. As you can see, the real time position of this river basin is the 10th percentile bracket (drier than normal); the perceived normal position is represented by the 50th percentile bracket and obviously does not reflect reality.
In this scenario planning exercise Lake Powell is not producing hydropower for the rest of the century and all the runs end in the inactive pool for decades, and some scenarios stay in the dead pool position for decades.
This scenario suggests a possible explanation for the behavior of the seven states to surrender on August 16th, 2022; to submit a repsonse of no action to Reclamation staff and put the onus on them to create the necessary solution. In other words, the states understand that stakeholder-driven solutions are not possible, and solutions that invovle water reductions to balance the water budget are just not feasible. Because they permitted infrastructure for new communities with a water supply based on fantasies.
Such stalemates are the legacy of intrastate relationships and why, for instance, the states divided this river basin into two parts (upper and lower) during the final negotiations for the Colorado River Compact in 1922, and also the litigation in the US Supreme Court case from 1952 to the Decree of 1964, and known as Arizona vs California. Both of these actions were just unhelpful to everyone, except the five tribes of the lower Colorado River (See: Decree of AZ v CA).
At present, the states conveniently claim lack of leadership from the federal government. Though this claim is partialy true, most of the angst shoud be directed is to the states and their inability to provide robust leadership and for the last 100-years and will persist into the future. When the reservoirs go empty, and they will, their efficiency programs, their demand management schemes, and their shining new diversion projects, was money directed to bad choices at the worst possible time.
WHAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SAID IT WOULD DO
In the Upper Basin, Reclamation will:
WHAT SHOUD BE DONE
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